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Poetry and philosophy have had a long and convoluted relation, charac-
terized often by mutual antipathy and rarely by mutual acknowledgment 
and respect. Plato was one infl uential philosopher who trashed poetry’s 
capacities to trade in the domain of truth and knowledge, but it was J. 
L. Austin who blew the fi nal whistle by dismissing it as non-serious. And 
while for many poets that was an invitation to dismiss Austin, for many 
philosophers that was a confi rmation of the overall discomfort they had 
already felt with respect to poetry. Just how wrong both parties were in 
this standoff is revealed in the latest book by Maximilian De Gaynesford, 
The Rift in the Lute: Attuning Poetry and Philosophy, which calls for a 
dismissal of the separation of the two and for their mutual cooperation. 
In this paper, we look at De Gaynesford’s proposal, mostly praising its 
strong points and occasionally raising doubts regarding its success.   
Keywords: J. L. Austin, philosophy, poetry, Maximilian De Gaynes-
ford
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that philosophers have, for the most 
part, ignored poetry (see Ribeiro 2009; Gibson 2015). Luckily, things 
are changing and poetry has started to attract attention. The latest 
book by Maximilian De Gaynesford, The Rift in the Lute: Attuning 
Poetry and Philosophy, is a much welcome addition to this trend, one 
which will for sure initiate its own wave of responses. Gaynesford does 
not aim to say much about the aesthetic or artistic value of poetry, and 
he doesn’t dwell on issues of defi nition. Rather, he deals with one of 
the most infl uential claims regarding poetry ever made: J. L. Austin’s 
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views on poetry as ‘not serious’. Determined to prove Austin wrong, 
Gaynesford sets out to develop a new account of poetry and to suggest 
new ways in which to view the convoluted relationship between poetry 
and philosophy.
As Gaynesford argues, it is of particular importance for analytic 
philosophy to turn to poetry, and to do so from the perspective of a 
speech act theory: it is here that “relations between literature and phi-
losophy are at their worst” and “their antipathy” at its deepest (12-3). 
Consequently, to reconcile them, that is the place to start. How? By 
following the project of attunement—“a mutually shaping approach in 
which we really do philosophy in really appreciating poetry, doing the 
literary criticism necessary for this” (9). Gaynesford’s project is thus a 
matter not of applying philosophy to poetry—thus doing a philosophi-
cally minded literary criticism—but the one of “exercising our critical 
engagement with poems in engaging with philosophy, and exercising 
our critical engagement with philosophy in engaging with poems.” (10). 
Such joint collaboration is envisioned as a win-win situation for both: 
“The opportunity to appreciate philosophical distinctions and discrimi-
nations in poetry can improve our ability to discriminate features of 
philosophical signifi cance. And this opportunity to grapple anew with 
philosophy in turn heightens our capacity to appreciate what is rich 
and subtle in poetry, which returns us more richly provided to pursue 
philosophy, from where we can go back more generously supplied to 
appreciate poetry, and so on, back and forth” (11).
At the centre of the attunement project is a radical turn from the 
way philosophers (and critics, to some extent) usually approach poetry, 
namely from the point of view of its alleged disconnection from the 
truth. While philosophers mostly attend to poetry in order to either 
show or to dispute that poetic language is incommensurable to the 
epistemic goals of conveying truth,1 Gaynesford sets his theory in a 
completely different setting: that of philosophy of action. Rather than 
approaching poetry as a set of true or false statements or descriptions, 
Gaynesford suggests that saying things in poetry—uttering poetical-
ly—is not a matter of stating things but of doing things. Those familiar 
with Gaynesford’s philosophical profi le will not be surprised to learn 
that his account is motivated by J. L. Austin’s famous statement about 
poetry not being serious.
These brief introductory remarks suffi ce to position Gaynesford’s 
book within the relevant theoretical framework: in the fi rst part, 
Gaynesford works out the details of his attunement project by carefully 
and informatively elaborating on the ways in which Austin dismisses 
poetry as serious (ch. 1), and by examining how poets and critics (ch. 2), 
as opposed to philosophers (ch. 3), reacted to Austin’s remarks. He then 
moves on (chs. 4 and 5) to show how these debates refl ected on poetry’s 
connection to truth, and ends by arguing for a paradigm shift (chs. 6 
1 See in particular essays gathered in Gibson (2015).
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and 7): poetry should be viewed as a form of action, and poetic utteranc-
es as utterances which actually do things. Once this approach is taken, 
a need is generated to account for the responsibility and commitment 
of those creating poetry. In the second part, Gaynesford fi rst analyzes 
(ch.7) what he calls ‘the Chaucer type utterances’ and, having expli-
cated their main features (chs. 9-11), applies his account to numerous 
Shakespeare’s sonnets. It is in this part that he engages in a rather 
insightful form of literary criticism, one which presupposes an attuned 
relationship between poetry and philosophy, showing the drawbacks 
of those critical views on Shakespeare which failed to appreciate what 
a philosophically minded reader can see in the sonnets, and what the 
sonnets can reveal to the reader open to philosophical concerns.
The richness of Gaynesford’s theoretical framework does not imply 
lack of detailed and meticulous exploration of its constituents, includ-
ing, in the opening and closing chapter, a detailed analysis of real world 
examples in which poetry was taken seriously enough for its creators 
to face serious legal issues. In many ways, his interpretation of the re-
lationship between poetry and philosophy is insightful, primarily due 
to his exhausting overview of various poets, critics and philosophers 
who had something to say on the topic. Gaynesford’s analysis along 
these lines will challenge the somewhat dominant view according to 
which philosophers, on the whole, are hostile to poetry, and according 
to which poetry has, for the most part, been the “victim of Austin’s ef-
fi ciencies”. It will also cast doubt on the way Austin’s views on poetry 
are most commonly interpreted. As Gaynesford argues, though Austin 
represents poetry as non-serious use of language, where language is 
not used in the normal way, or is used in hollow and void way, para-
sitic upon the normal use (39), he neither argues for these claims, nor 
does he clarify their meaning. Austin’s crucial failure is the fact that 
“the combination of high-handedness and half-heartedness” in his writ-
ings on poetry, as well as the examples he chose to support his view, 
“give the strong impression that he recognized something forced about 
... this insistence that poetic utterances are not to be understood in 
terms of things that are done” (259, emphasis original). In other words, 
Austin’s remarks “make no distinction between types and instances of 
poetic utterances”, offer “no arguments to demonstrate that no poetry 
is serious”, and ignore the ambiguity of notions he uses to express the 
alleged non-seriousness (39). The dominantly poetic manner itself, in 
which Austin writes about poetry, as compared to his other writings, 
reveals, on Gaynesford’s reading, that Austin himself has hard time 
accepting what he says—his argument, in other words, “resists taking 
itself seriously” (44).
Gaynesford further argues that most of the poets who set out to 
respond to Austin failed to properly engage with his views, mostly due 
to a prejudice they harboured about philosophy’s overall distrust of phi-
losophy. And while critics have for the most part turned Austin into a 
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bad guy unappreciative of the value of poetry, Gaynesford argues that 
Austin is far more appreciative of poetry than Plato or Frege ever were; 
his bad reputation is a consequence of critics’ failure to engage properly 
with philosophical views. The critics are, generally, just as “careless 
and disdainful” (58) towards Austin as Austin is toward poetry. Sadly, 
philosophers are no better. In failing to properly engage with Austin’s 
remarks, they “expose their own prejudice against poetry: they condone 
the insults, neglect the tensions and contradictions, hide the ambigui-
ties, and assume a determinacy where all is vagueness”. Consequently, 
“no wonder so much that is philosophically signifi cant in poetry is ig-
nored, and so much in philosophy that is relevant to the appreciation of 
poetry goes unrecognized” (68-9). As Gaynesford further demonstrates 
in the fi fth chapter, another failure on the part of philosophers relates 
to the fact that for the most part, they analyzed poetry as if poetry 
was to be evaluated from the perspective of whether or not it told the 
truth about the world. Such misconception is itself an outcome of the 
‘governing assumption’ among philosophers, one which Austin himself 
set out to refute, according to which it is the main function of language 
to describe things. Whereas Austin wanted to show that language also 
does things, i.e. that we do things when we utter propositions, philoso-
phers remained focused on analyzing poetry’ s success or failure to cor-
rectly describe things, and completely ignored the fact that it too can 
get things done. On Gaynesford’s view, “this way of approaching poetry 
renders essential features of poetry invisible and distorts literary criti-
cism” (261). To amend such mistreatment, Gaynesford offers his own, 
attuned account.
Gaynesford’s analysis showed that, appearances aside, philosophers 
and poets do agree that poetic uses of language are exempt from issues 
of commitment and responsibility. However, it is precisely this presup-
position that is wrong, which can only be acknowledged once poetry 
is approached from the standpoint of philosophy of action, and within 
it, from the perspective of a speech act theory. Within such “realigned 
debate”, issues of commitment and responsibility can be reassessed. As 
Gaynesford argues, poets can use language seriously, for “to be serious 
is to acknowledge what is required if one is to be taken seriously: a 
commitment to be reasonably clear about what one means, to be willing 
to explain what one says, to account for what one claims. And it is not 
only possible but actual that poets commit themselves responsibly in 
these various ways (for example, in essays, reviews, manifestos, inter-
views)” (110). Crucial questions that are to be asked with respect to po-
etry under such an account are questions “about who is accountable for 
a particular utterance, what was intended by some particular choice 
of words, whether the action performed is one for which its author can 
be praised or blamed”—questions, as Gaynesford argues, that already 
“defi ne literary criticism and which commentators on poetry have 
placed at the centre of their endeavours” (112). As a crucial example of 
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a poet who used poetry in this manner, Gaynesford refers to Chaucer, 
whose poems are riddled with what Gaynesford calls Chaucer-type ut-
terances. These utterances are composed of a fi rst person concatenated 
with a verb in the present indicative active (i.e. I dedicate, I direct) and 
they correspond to what would in non-poetry be equivalent to ‘explicit 
performatives’—though naturally the proper classifi cation is compli-
cated by the fact that such performatives are further divided into vari-
ous subgroups. As Gaynesford warns us, there is a considerable dis-
agreement regarding this type of utterances, but he nevertheless goes 
on to elaborate on four main features they exhibit: doing (in uttering 
the relevant sentence, the speaker does something beyond uttering), 
phrasing (the sentence uttered contains a sentential clause consisting 
of a subject term (the fi rst person pronoun in the nominative) concat-
enated with a verb of doing (fi rst-person singular, resent tense, indica-
tive mood, active voice) combined with an explicit or implicit ‘hereby’ or 
its equivalent); naming (the verb in the sentential clause is a word for 
what the speaker does in uttering the sentence) and securing (the act 
named by the verb in the sentential clause is assuredly performed in 
uttering the sentence).  Given that these four features can be employed 
in variety of ways, analysing various combinations in which they come 
together in any given poem offers additional chance for philosophers 
of language to analyse them, but it also offers to critics a possibility to 
analyze such poems from different perspectives—after all, that is what 
the attunement approach is meant to initiate.
To support his claims, in the fi nal chapters of the book Gaynesford 
turns to Shakespeare’s sonnets and analyses how the great bard uses 
the four features of Chaucer-type utterance. “Recognizing the dramatic 
salience of the type has the power to develop and change the way we 
see the sequence [of sonnets] as a whole, as well as the individual po-
ems of which it is composed” states Gaynesford (263), and goes on to 
show numerous ways in which Shakespeare deploys the four features, 
often modifying them, even to the point where it is not altogether cer-
tain whether the Chaucer type has in fact been used. However, such 
ambiguity is identifi ed as the source of variations of meaning of the 
sonnets, which result from different ways in which phases and lines 
in poems might be understood. Such an approach enables Gaynesford 
to, among other things, analyse ways in which some of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets are imbued with Cartesian type of scepticism, with consider-
ations regarding limits and limitations, obligations and duties, one’s 
solipsistic worries, etc. It further enables him to analyse ways in which 
different poems refl ect on poetry as a mode of using language and on 
poetry as a form of action, which in turn draws attention to the means 
we have at our disposal to study poetry, and to the philosophical issues 
generated by these means.
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Gaynesford’s account of poetry departs from some of the ways in which 
poetry is traditionally analyzed, which will either seem like a welcome 
new paradigm to be happily embraced, or like a dead-end street to be 
quickly abandoned. There are, we think, many important aspects of 
his proposal which give us a more profound understanding of poetry, 
and his ambition to reconcile poetry and philosophy seems promis-
ing—though the question remains whether those untrained in philoso-
phy could appreciate poetry generally and individual poems in ways 
Gaynesford envisions. Gaynesford does not place much emphasis on 
the aesthetic aspects of poetry, and when he does, he subjects them to 
the goals that poetic utterances containing such aesthetic properties 
are to realize. By thus instrumentalizing what for many is the cru-
cial aspect of poetry and poetic experience, Gaynesford’s theory might 
be dismissed by authors who oppose subjecting poetry to philosophi-
cal concerns. On the other hand, there have been attempts recently, 
predominantly made by literary scholars or poets themselves, to show 
ways in which poetry (and literature more generally) manages to bring 
about some more tangible changes, whether in the mindset of individ-
ual reader or within wider social groups and cultures.2 For those who 
appreciate such approach to poetry and who share such views on its 
potential, Gaynesford’s book might serve as an insightful pointer on 
how poetry might have such power, as his account is well suited to 
explain the tendency of critics to talk of poetry as achieving (or having 
the effect of initiating) intellectual paradigm changes. Another way in 
which Gaynesford’s account is inspiring relates to what it might add 
to our understanding of the poetic language and everyday communica-
tion. Gaynesford notes that “examples of poetic utterances reveal un-
derlying distinctions in the way poetry does things with words. The 
addition of new categories of actions, some peculiar to poetry, reveals 
ways in which philosophy can increase knowledge of language-use by 
attending to poetry.” (114) It would be theoretically useful to identify 
those speech-acts ‘peculiar to poetry’ and see in which relation they 
stand with other kinds of speech acts. If regular speech acts as stating 
or promising can be incorporated in poems, is there a place for poetic 
speech acts in everyday communication? Do poetic speech acts turn ev-
eryday communication into poetry or is it so that they cannot be part of 
it since it would mean that they are not exclusively poetic? Identifying 
those speech acts ‘peculiar to poetry’ would be a good start in analyzing 
the relation between poetry and other uses of language.
The backbone to Gaynesford’s proposal is the idea of poetry as a 
form of action. To many, it is this particular premise in his overall ac-
count that might be the hardest to swallow. Of course Gaynesford is 
aware of that, and he dedicates the entire chapter 5 to smooth some 
possible objections. Three he sees as the most pressing: fi rst, whether 
poetic utterances can indeed be understood as action, given that they 
2 Consider among others Attridge (2015), Spolsky (2015).
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do not resemble our commonsense understanding of what an action 
is—namely, a physical movement. Second, Gaynesford raises the ques-
tion about the ‘deed done’ via the action contained in poetic utterance: 
are these things done once and for all (as when Chaucer dedicates his 
poem to the Lord), or are they done anew each time someone reads a 
certain poem? Third set of problems concerns the issue of agency: who 
in fact is doing the deed, the poet, the poem, the ‘lyric subject’ or some 
other theoretical postulate? With respect to the latter two questions, 
Gaynesford ultimately concludes that their theoretical implications 
relate to interpretations of individual poems, and do not amount to 
reasons to dismiss his theory. To answer the fi rst question, he invokes 
a distinction introduced by Austin himself, between ordinary physical 
actions and the special nature of the act of saying something. Claim-
ing that the poetic utterance falls under the latter category, he ulti-
mately sees the problem of classifying poetic utterances as instances 
of an action as a question that should be considered within philosophy 
of action, rather than as a question pertaining to debates on poetry. 
Independently of whether or not such an answer is suffi cient to silent 
those who might object to his approach, it is not altogether a mistake to 
say that Gaynesford should tell us more about his own understanding 
of action, given the complexities involved in the notion itself, particu-
larly when introduced into aesthetic debates (Davies 2011). This is par-
ticularly so given the emphasis he puts on the notion of responsibility, 
and on the question of ‘whether what was stated has been performed’, 
which he poses as a criterion for the poem’s success (as opposed to the 
question of whether what is stated is true). While interviews, diaries 
and other evidential support he invokes to support his theory might 
work for some poets, they do not necessarily account for many others, 
particularly those who are long gone.
Gaynesford’s tactic of undermining Austin’s disregard for poetry 
as non-serious is simple: since Austin does not discriminate between 
different kinds of poetic expression and claims on various occasions 
that “poetry is ‘a use of language’ which is ‘not serious’” all we need to 
prove him wrong is fi nd one instance of poetry that can be regarded as 
serious. Of course, the idea of “serious” and “non-serious” uses of lan-
guage is a complex one since it derives from very vague and ambiguous 
use of the terms (see 42-68), but what Gaynesford is devoted to is to 
fi nd (at least) one instance of poetry that can be “responsible, commit-
ted, and thus ‘serious’”, that is, that can be used to back up the claim 
that we can “do things with poetry” in the real word. According to him, 
responsibility can be of three sorts: pragmatic, aesthetic and ethical 
(107-8). It is important to notice that according to Gaynesford there 
is no responsibility without intention: “Did the person who performed 
this action really mean to do what in fact they did? Did they realize 
what obligations would be laid on them by doing this? Did they accept, 
consent to, or undertake these obligations? For if the answer to any of 
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these questions is ‘No’, then we may refuse to hold the person respon-
sible for what was done, or at least qualify their responsibility, at each 
of the three levels: pragmatic, aesthetic, ethical.” (109) Trying to give 
an answer to questions of this sort in relation to poems whose authors 
are long gone could be puzzling. How do we reconcile the temporality of 
the poem’s author with the atemporality of the work of art? If the poet 
had a certain intention at the moment of the utterance, that is, at the 
moment he penned it in the form of a poem, he could be held account-
able at that moment, but the analysis becomes metaphysically dubious 
once the referent of the “I” in a poem is gone—provided we can agree to 
identify it with the author as Gaynesford does when he claims that “in 
successful poetic utterances, poets perform acts of responsibility and 
commitment” (114). On the other hand, if we do not identify it with 
the poet, then all talk about real-life commitment and responsibility 
becomes vacuous.
Gaynesford acknowledges that “some would deny that responsibil-
ity and commitment are ever possible in the particular context that is 
poetry” and defends his position once again claiming that we need only 
one good example of “serious” poetry: “To undermine [Austin’s position], 
we need not argue that poetry is always, or indeed usually, responsible, 
committed, and thus ‘serious’. We need only produce examples of com-
mitment-apt utterances in poetry where there is a genuine attempt to 
make that commitment, and where that commitment is indeed made.” 
(110) The Chaucer-type phrases are thus introduced as indicators of 
responsibility. Still, this is not an unequivocal answer since it leads to 
the question: who is the agent? Gaynesford acknowledges that there 
is no simple answer to this question and proposes a case by case ap-
proach—every poem will provide a new challenge: “(…) the claim that 
poetic uttering can count as a form of action, a speech action, raises dif-
fi culties. But none of these diffi culties amount to objections to the over-
all claim. Rather, they set an agenda for the interpretation of specifi c 
poems, a list of questions that interpretations must resolve to count as 
satisfying. And this agenda proves an essential device. For where these 
diffi culties arise, they direct the attention to the very issues that the 
poem itself is trying to raise.” (106)
Gaynesford’s strategy is to inspect every poem, or perhaps even 
every verse in a poem, to fi nd a proof of commitment on the part of 
speaker to the content of the poetic utterance. If we fi nd one example of 
a committed speaker in a poem we have falsifi ed Austin’s claim that all 
poetic utterances are non-serious. If we concede this point, agree with 
Gaynesford’s interpretation of Austin’s view of poetry (see ch. 3) and 
fi nd one or more poems that satisfy the criteria of his action-oriented 
approach to poetry, we can still wonder if the fact that we can analyze 
only a small portion of poems using this adapted speech-act framework 
does not point to a weaknesses of the proposed approach. One counter-
example is enough to falsify a theory, but we need more than one exam-
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ple (or a few of them) to build our theory. This is true especially if the 
theory we try to falsify is in fact not about the particular phenomena 
we focus on in our attacks on it, and Austin’s theory is not about poetry.
Gaynesford’s account could be bolstered by a more substantial ac-
count of the way in which composing a poem can be understood as 
an instance of action, except in the sense in which the act of writing 
is itself an instance of action—which, of course, is not what Gaynes-
ford’s account suggests or aims to establish. While in the Chaucer ex-
ample it is unproblematic to recognize the deed done—the dedication 
of a certain poem to someone—some other examples that Gaynesford 
uses might not work quite as easy. Consider his treatment of Douglas 
Dunn’s poem ‘Arrangements’:
   And here I am, closing the door behind me,
   Turning the corner on a wet day in March.
As Gaynesford argues, “the line-break acts like a corner to be turned, 
thus enabling the utterance to do precisely what is says” (101). Howev-
er, it seems strange, if not utterly impossible, that an act of saying does 
the job of turning the corner, independently of the line break. In other 
words, it is the act of walking that makes one turn the corner, not the 
act of saying that one is turning the corner (or an act of inserting the 
line-break in the appropriate place in the poem). The most that these 
two lines do is describe what the poet is doing, but they are not doing 
the deed (i.e. the act of turning the corner) itself. In that sense, even if 
‘what is stated is done’, this still does not count as an instance in which 
poetic utterance has in fact committed any kind of action (other than 
that of describing). The question then remains for the reader to decide 
whether this is an instance of an ill-chosen example, or whether we 
should demand more in terms of criteria which turn some (as Gaynes-
ford rightly emphasizes) poetic utterances into actions. 
Perhaps such criteria would be available if more was said about 
questions two and three identifi ed above. Namely, if poetic utterances 
are a form of action, what precisely is the deed done or brought about 
via these actions? In some cases, as with Chaucer, it is the one of dedi-
cating a poem to someone. However, even assuming the plausibility of 
categorizing such poetic utterances as a form of action, what are the 
implications of that categorization for our understanding of poetry? In 
other words, does the fact that some poems are dedicated to someone, 
or that some poets invoke the help of the Muse or manage to perform 
some such action via their verses, justify the acceptance of the ‘poetry 
as action’ paradigm, or does it merely point to the (another) interesting 
way in which language works in some poems?
An answer to this question is, arguably, suggested by Gaynesford’s 
interesting analysis of Shakespeare’s sonnets. This analysis gives the 
impression that what is in fact done, the action that is triggered by the 
composition of a poem, is better located in the workings of the poem, i.e. 
in the way in which it initiates (philosophical) refl ections in the read-
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er. Bluntly put, what the poet does, on this interpretation, is not only 
dedicating his poem to someone, but a more substantial act of causing 
his readers to undergo certain experiences. After all, poetic encounters 
leave us with the sense of having undergone some kind of emotional 
and intellectual experience—for example, that of recognizing and ap-
preciating, potentially even engaging with, the sceptical worries under-
lying Shakespeare’ sonnets, or, to suggest our example, of sensing the 
pain and disappointment of a speaker who urges us ‘Never to give all 
the heart’ in Yeats’ famous poem of that title, and then of considering 
whether one would indeed renounce the possibility of passionate love in 
light of the poem. This line of thinking about the attunement is in line 
with the criteria Gaynesford himself emphasizes: in order for poetry to 
be serious, poetic utterances have to exhibit commitment and respon-
sibility. In other words, one has to be capable of doing what one says. 
More elaborately, “those responsible for poetic utterances must be able 
to count as such in a deeper sense than mere causal effi cacy. It must be 
possible and actual for them to commit themselves in saying what they 
do. Hence it must be possible and actual for them to be, and to be held 
to be, responsible in what they say.” (110)
This criterion will naturally raise the bar for what counts as serious 
poetry, i.e. which instances of poetry might count as serious (even if it 
does not help us account for what is for something to be poetry). When 
Yeats (if indeed Yeats it is, rather than the lyrical subject) urges us 
‘Never to give all the heart’, and enlists rather persuasive arguments 
for such a statement in his poem, are we to take him seriously, or are 
we to enjoy the particular way in which the rhythm and rhyme work to-
gether to make this poem an aesthetic delight? Would he himself com-
mit never to give up all the heart? Would he, let us wonder, repudiate 
his own advice had he but had a chance for happiness with his long 
desired Maude Gonne? Another problem that arises from embracing 
the ‘responsibility and commitment’ criterion relates to the fact that 
Gaynesford’s account presupposes some type of intentionalism on the 
part of the poet to do certain acts—namely those for which he is will-
ing to take responsibility. But, as numerous critics of intentionalism 
have pointed out, it is not necessarily so that poetry is to be considered, 
appreciated and evaluated according to the standards provided by the 
intentionalist framework.
Some poets of course do commit and can be held responsible for 
what they are saying. To consider their poems as an instance of an ac-
tion, rather than as true (or false) array of statements referring to the 
real world, is a plausible move, if by action one has in mind a kind of 
intellectual activity that takes place in the readers’ mind in the ‘after-
life’ of a poem (as Peter Kivy might put it (Kivy 2006)), or that inspires 
poets to turn to particular issues and write about them. When Kant 
talks about poetry ‘animating the mind’ (Kant 2000, for a discussion 
see Šustar and Vidmar 2016, Vidmar 2018, Vidmar forthcoming), he 
might think of some such understanding of the ways in which poetry 
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does things to us, in addition to moving us via the sheer power of its 
aesthetic qualities. Consider much of religious poetry or various in-
stances of metaphysical poetry. Robert Frost’s repeated questioning 
into the moral status of natural creatures and men’s relation to the 
world, satisfy, we think, not only the claim that poetry can be an action, 
but exemplify a poet committed to that what is stated in his writings 
and willing to take responsibility for such actions, even if not always 
using Chaucer-type of utterances. At best then we can conclude that, 
as usually the case with philosophical theories, Gaynesford’s account 
works for some, but not for all poetry, and does not cover all instances 
of poetic creation.
What then to conclude regarding the connection between poetry and 
philosophy? Certainly, Gaynesford has a point in stating that the at-
tunement approach challenges our understanding of both, poetry and 
philosophy. To understand the way in which Shakespeare manages to 
develop a view on the passing of time or to envision sceptical concerns 
makes a demand on scholars to reconsider ways in which philosophy 
can be conducted, as well as the limits of poetic engagements. On the 
other hand, philosophers such as John Gibson or Peter Lamarque 
might nevertheless insist on the futility of attunement, each for his 
own reasons. Gibson could argue that even if poetry is a form of action, 
its ties to philosophy are not established, given that the two disciplines 
do not entwine but remain separated by the mere diversity of their 
methods. Lamarque, himself a fervent opponent to approaching poetry 
from the standpoint of the truth debate, might argue that attending 
to the way in which Shakespeare develops a sceptical view is not to be 
evaluated by philosophical but literary/aesthetic criteria.3 Consequent-
ly, nothing much is gained in terms of developing a more elaborate ac-
count of poetry generally, by appreciating philosophical considerations 
of some poems. It is not clear, to us at least, that Gaynesford’s account 
would seem convincing to someone who shares Gibson or Lamarque’s 
concerns. What is convincing though is his plea for taking poetry seri-
ously and to continue analysing its ties to philosophy.
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